In his relationship to the Fuehrer, his functions were not merely executive, but involved a very complex process of giving and taking, altering and retrenching, warning and stimulating.' For this reason, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Jodl) was an extremely important figure in all strategic decisions.

It was not recognized that, although Hitler in the final analysis might only follow his own trend of thought, he acquired the inner assurance necessary for his actions by constantly discussing his intentions within the confines of his inner circle. The view was widely held that the Fuehrer did not accept any opinion other than his own. These facts were so little known to the outside world that the public scarcely knew Jodl, and that within the Wehrmacht-even among those in leading positions-he was mostly considered only as an executive tool, by some people even as too willing a tool. It was also he who raised objections and suggestions which had been voiced by the immediately subordinate commands. It was again Jodl who obtained the information necessary to transmute a vague idea into a workable plan. Whenever the Fuehrer conceived a new military plan it and closely examined. Jodl also was responsible for their execution. 'The function of Genobst Jodl in the Fuehrer's headquarters consisted of preparing-on the general staff level-the decisions the Fuehrer made in his capacity of C-in-C of the Wehrmacht. It is analyzed by the headquarters diary-keeper and historian, Maj. The relationship between these two men has bearing on the entire 'prehistory' of the Ardennes campaign. It is possible, however, that Hitler had discussed the operational concept of a counteroffensive through the Ardennes with Jodl-and before the 16 September edict. This simplified version was agreed to in the months after the war by all of those major German military figures in Hitler's entourage who survived the last battles and the final Gotterdammerung purges. Why the Ardennes? To answer this question in a simple and direct manner is merely to say that the Ardennes would be the scene of a great winter battle because the Fuehrer had placed his finger on a map and made a pronouncement.

Having nominated a headquarters to control the reconstitution of units specifically named for participation in an attack to be made in the west, the logical next step in development of the plan came in Hitler's announcement on 16 September: the attack would be delivered in the Ardennes and Antwerp would be the objective. As a first step the SS panzer divisions in the west were ordered out of the line (13 September) and turned over to a new army headquarters, that of the Sixth Panzer Army. But in the main, the plan still evolving within the closed confines of the Wolf's Lair turned on the withdrawal and rehabilitation of units which had taken part in the battle for France. These 'side shows' could be levied upon for the western counteroffensive, and even the sore-beset German armies in the east, or so Hitler reasoned, could contribute armored divisions to the west. The northern theater likewise was a potential source of reinforcements, particularly following the defection of Finland in early September and the collapse of a homogeneous front. The southeastern theater now was bereft of much of its early significance and the German forces therein stood to lose most of their heavy equipment in the event of a Soviet drive into the Balkans. On 4 September OKW ordered a general movement of artillery units in the Balkans back to the Western Front.

Enemy front ardennes